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NOTES AND COMMENTS
It is submitted that in the instant case the court, would have adopted
the better view and followed the modern trend had it upheld the cove-
nant as far as it was shown to be reasonable, namely, eastern North
Carolina, and thus given the employer the protection needed.
MARTIN B. SImPsoN, JR.
Mortgages-Absolute Deeds--Binding as Against the
Grantor (Mortgagor); Void as Against Creditors
Courts throughout the United States recognize that a deed, although
absolute in form, upon proper proof will be considered a mortgage.'
Courts differ, however, in determining what constitutes proper proof.
Apparently North Carolina is the only state requiring proof of some
general ground of equitable relief before parol evidence will be ad-,
mitted to show that the deed, although absolute in form, was in fact
intended as a mortgage. 2 All other states seem to have abandoned this
strict view and will permit reformation if there is sufficient parol proof
of the intent to establish a security.3 The standard statement of the
North Carolina court is that two things must be proved, "1. It must
appear that the clause of redemption was omitted through ignorance,
mistake, fraud, or undue advantage. 2. The intention [to create a se-
curity] must be established, not by simple declarations of the parties,
but by proof of facts and circumstances dehors the deed, inconsistent
with the idea of an absolute purchase .... -4 It is also a general re-
quirement that the proof be clear, cogent, strong, and convincing.
The most recent statement of this proposition is in Posten v. Bowen5
where the relation of employer-employee was not considered sufficient
in itself to constitute undue advantage6 in the ommission of the clause
of redemption. As a result the grantor was non-suited.
This conservative view would seem to be based upon our court's
almost unswerving adherence to the parol evidence rule and the land
contract section of the Statute of Frauds.7 The court feels that to
allow parol proof of the security intent without first finding general
1 See Note, L.R.A. 1916B 18 for an extensive analysis of the broad proposi-
tion and applicable cases from all jurisdictions; Note, 16 N. C. L REv. 416
(1938) discusses the North Carolina view.
'Note, L.R.A. 1916B 18, 47; 1 JONEs, MORTGAGES §375 (8th ed. 1928),
'Notes, 155 A.L.R. 1104 (1945); 79 A.L.R. 937 (1932).
'E.g., Davenport v. Phelps, 215 N. C. 326, 1 S.E. 2d 824 (1939); Newbern
v. Newbern, 178 N. C. 3, 100 S.E. 77 (1919); Frazier v. Frazier, 129 N. C.
30, 39 S.E. 634 (1901); Watkins v. Williams, 123 N. C. 170, 31 S. E. 388
(1898); Sprague v. Bond, 115 N. C. 530, 20 S.E. 709 (1894); Kelly v. Bryan,
41 N. C. 283 (1849); Streator v. Jones, 10 N. C. 433 (1824) (dissent). For a
more exhaustive list see Note, 16 N. C. L. Rav. 416 (1938).
5228 N. C. 202, 44 S.E. 2d 881 (1947).
'Variously referred to as undue influence, oppression, or advantage taken
of grantor's necessities.
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §22-2 (1943).
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grounds for equity jurisdiction would .". . . in effect . . .make titles
to property, which ought to be evidenced by solemn instruments in
writing-to depend . . .on the 'slippery memories' of witnesses .... 
The cases declaring this proposition seem to be completely analogous
to those in which it is attempted to engraft a parol trust in favor of
the grantor upon an absolute deed.9 Such parol trusts are systematically
refused' ° unless there is clear, cogent, strong, and convincing proof
of fraud, ignorance, mistake, undue influence, or a breach of a confi-
dential relationship. The reasons generally used in this situation also
are the parol evidence rule and the land contract section of the Statute
of Frauds." This trust law has been criticized as inconsistent in view
of the fact that parol trusts are freely engrafted upon absolute deeds
when made in favor of a third person contemporaneously with the
deed, without considering that either the parol evidence rule or Statute
of Frauds constitutes an obstacle.' 2
Both the absolute deed as security and the parol trust conveyance
are obviously dangerous and are resorted to only by ill-advised per-
sons who have found themselves in a financial corner. Not the least
danger is that if the deed is recorded and the land sold, the grantor will
be confronted with a perfect record title and he will be unable to re-
deem. At most he will have, an action against his crafty grantee. Fur-
thermore, even if the grantee has retained the title the grantor will
be confronted with what is usually an insurmountable burden of proof,18
since in most instances the defeasance clause was omitted purposely
and not through fraud, mistake, ignorance, or undue advantage. The
grantor simply chose to rely upon his grantee's agreement. Thus the
reports abound with instances where the alleged borrower fails to ob-
tain the desired reformation of the deed. The court must be cautious,
of course, in order to prevent reformation of deeds actually intended
to be absolute.
Although our court has placed what amounts to an insurmountable
requirement of proof upon the grantor when he brings such an action,
an indirect approach exists which might bring the desired relief. A
'Clement v. Cement, 54 N. C. 184, 185 (1854).
0 Ibid.
"E.g., Wadsell v. Aycock, 195 N. C. 268, 142 S.E. 10 (1928); Chilton v.
Smith, 180 N. C. 472, 105 S.E. 1 (1920); Walters v. Walters, 172 N. C. 328,
90 S.E. 304 (1916); Campbell v. Sigmon, 170 N. C. 348, 87 S.E. 116 (1915);
Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, 63 S.E. 1028 (1909); Ferguson v. Haas,
64 N. C. 772 (1870).Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, 227, 63 S.E. 1028, 1031 (1909).
2 For an analysis of the parol trust cases, mild criticism of results, and
suggested improvement see: Lord and Van Hecke, Parol Trusts in North Caro.
lina, 8 N. C. L. REv. 152 (1929).
" Only the security intent need be proved when the defeasance clause is a
separate writing. Proof of fraud, ignorance, mistake, or undue advantage is
added only when the defeasance is oral. See Note, 16 N. C. L. Rsv. 416 (1938).
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line of cases14 which is equally well established in our law sets forth
the general proposition that a deed which is intended as security is
void as to creditors of the grantor upon a showing of the security
intent.15 No proof of fraud, ignorance, mistake, or undue advantage is
required. The deed is said to be void "without regard to any intent
on their part to defraud creditors."' 01 This result is due to a presump-
tion of fraud in .the conveyance in that it tends to defraud, delay, and
hinder creditors in the pursuit of their just claims. 1 7 In short, the
grantor's interest is not properly disclosed, and is thus hidden from
creditors who would otherwise resort to it for the satisfaction of their
claims.
That an anomalous situation is created can be illustrated as follows:
Asume that a distressed debtor did borrow money, did give an abso-
lute deed to secure the debt, cannot prove that the defeasance clause
was omitted due to any of the factors heretofore mentioned, but can
prove facts showing that a security was in fact intended. Then the
deed will stand as an absolute conveyance as against the grantor, but
as against a creditor of the grantor, upon the same proof, the deed is
void. The anomaly is made even more obvious by cases declaring that
the deed is void even as against subsequent'8 creditors of the grantor.' 9
To complete the anomaly pointed out above, even the second prop-
osition that the deed is void as to creditors because it does not disclose
the grantor's interest would appear to rest upon a false premise in
"E.g., Foster v. Moore, 204 N. C. 9, 167 S.E. 383 (1932); Clement v.
Cozart, 109 N. C. 173, 13 S.E. 862 (1891); Gulley v. Macey, 84 N. C. 434
(1881); Johnson v. Murchison, 60 N. C. 286 (1864); King v..Cantrel, 26 N. C.
251 (1844); Holcombe v. Ray, 23 N. C. 340 (1840); Gregory v. Perkins, 15
N. C. 50 (1833) ; Gaither v. Mumford. 4 N. C. 600 (1816) setble.
1 Note, 16 N. C. L. RLV. 416 (1938) (circumstances considered as factors
bearing on the security intent are distress of the maker, prior negotiation of
the parties, continued existence of the debt, possession by grantor without pay-
ment of rent, and gross inadequacy of the price).
1Foster v. Moore, 204 N. C. 9, 11, 167 S.E. 383, 384 (1932); Gulley v.
Macey, 84 N. C. 434, 440 (1881).1 N. C. Gnu. STAT. §39-15 (1943) ; cases cited in Note, 16 N. C. L. Rxv. 416
(1938). In some cases the rule is said to be extracted from the general provisions
of -the registration statutes in that the deed cannot be registered as an absolute
deed because the parties did not so intend, nor as a mortgage because it does
hot purport to be one. E.g., Foster v. Moore, 204 N. C. 9, 11, 167 S.E. 383,
384 (1932) ; Bernhardt v. Brovn, 122 N. C. 587, 591, 29 S.E. 884, 885 (1898);
Gulley v. Macey, 84 N. C. 434, 439 (1881).
'Holcombe v. Ray, 23 N. C. 340, 344 (1840); Foster v. Moore, 204 N. C.
9, 167 S.E. 383 (1932) (this point not discussed, but relief was granted in favor
of a subsequent creditor).
"9 Th general rules concerning fraudulent conveyances stem from 13 ELIzA-
BE H . c. 5. The North Carolina version is embodied in N. C. GEI. STAT.
§39-15 (1943) to the effect that conveyances for the purpose of delaying, hinder-
ing, and defrauding creditors shall be "utterly void and of no effect," but the
statute is not always cited by the court. It is interesting to note that North
Carolina usually considers such a conveyance fraudulent and void as against
creditors as a matter of law. Most courts' hold that it is but a badge of fraud
and not conclusive evidence thereof. See Notes, L.R.A. 1916B 18, 576, 68 A.L.R.
306, 317 (1930).
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view of the first proposition that the deed stands absolute as to the
grantor in the absence of fraud, ignorance, mistake, or undue advantage.
In effect, on the one hand the court is saying, "The deed is absolute
and the grantor has no interest," while, on the other hand, with equal
vigor, it says, "The deed appears absolute, but the grantor has retained
an interest which is not properly disclosed thus the deed is void."
This contradiction of ideas would be eliminated by abolishing the
obsolete North Carolina requirement that fraud, ignorance, mistake,
or undue advantage must first be shown. Then, even in the absence
of such a showing, the debtor would indeed have an interest concealed
by the absolute character of the deed.
With the law of North Carolina in its present condition, the second
proposition that "the deed is void as to creditors of the grantor" would
seem to be of great value to debtors who have been forced to resort
to such a transaction. Such a debtor undoubtedly has creditors among
whom there should be one who is willing to pursue the property in
order to collect his debt. If none exists, then in view of the cases
extending the rule to subsequent creditors, there appears to be no
obstacle to the debtor's approaching a friend or relative for the purpose
of making a bona fide borrowing. By incurring an actual debt and
immediately defaulting, the debtor will enable the new creditor to be
in a position to proceed against the grantee to have the deed declared
void. Thus the burdensome requirement that the grantor must prove
fraud, ignorance, mistake, or undue advantage would seem to be so
easily circumvented as to be of questionable value at best. Furthermore,
the very fact that North Carolina is alone in imposing this require-
ment suggests doubt as to its value.2 0
Doing by indirection whaf cannot be done directly cannot be con-
demned in this instance since ultimate justice is attained. True, the
grantee has taken an absolute deed, but it was offered and accepted
as security for a debt. By a quirk in our law, unless fraud, ignorance,
mistake, or undue advantage can be shown, the deed has a legal effect
different from what the parties intended. The grantee has taken ad-
vantage of a rule of law which is favorable to him. But since the deed
was intended only as security for a debt, why should not the second
proposition be asserted to have the deed declared void? It was intend-
ed as a mortgage and as nothing else, thus the intent of the parties
has been violated no more by the second proposition than by the first.
The grantee-lender has played the ancient game of "heads I win; tails
you lose," for when the suit is at the instance of the grantor the grantee
is in a superior position whether the deed is declared a mortgage or
not. - If construed as a mortgage the grantee can collect the debt, in-
"o See notes 2 and 3, supra.
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terest, and, if the bargain called for it, rent for the time the grantor
remained in possession. 21 If construed as an absolute deed, as usually
happens, the grantee has complete title, probably for an inadequate con-
sideration. By using the creditor approach, the deed may be declared
a nullity and the grantee is defeated in his scheme. And no miscarriage
of justice against the grantee can result, for the creditor does have
to present clear, cogent, strong, and convincing evidence of the intent
to create a security.
JOSEPH C. MooRE, JR.
Parties--Divorce-Right of Guardian or Committee of
Incompetent to Maintain Action
In Phillips v. Phillips, a guardian brought an action for divorce on
behalf of his ward, an insane person, on the ground of adultery com-
mitted by the wife of the ward prior to his insanity. The complaint
alleged that prior to insanity the ward expressed his intention and
desire of getting a divorce from defendant and that at the time of
filing the suit and during a lucid interval when the ward was capable
of understanding the nature of the action, he again expressed the same
intention and desire. It was further alleged that the suit was instituted
pursuant to the ward's direction, desire and will at the time of filing
same. On demurrer, held: the guardian of an insane person' cannot
prosecute an action for divorce on behalf of his ward.
The court here enunciated what seems to be, in the absense of a gov-
erning statutory provision giving a guardian the right to institute a
divorce action on behalf of an insane ward, the universal rule in the
United States.2 The theory behind the rule is that the action of divorce
is one strictly personal and volitional, and the will of the guardian
cannot be substituted for that of the ward who is incapable of excer-
cising any will. The basis of the theory is that there are no offenses,
which by law, work of themselves a dissolution of a marriage, and
there are no offenses which may not be condoned by the injured
spouse.
21 N ote, 16 N. C. L. REv. 416, 418 (1938).
145 S. E. 2d 621 (Ga. 1947).
'Cohen v. Cohen, 73 Cal. App. 2d 330, 166 P. 2d 622 (1946); Worthy v.
Worthy, 36 Ga. 45 (1867); Bradford v. Abend, 89 I1. 78 (1878); Mohler v.
Shank, 93 Iowa 273, 61 N. W. 981 (1895); Birdzell v. Birdzell, 33 Kan. 433,
6 Pac. 651 (1885); Johnson v. Johnson, 294 Ky. 77, 170 S. W. 2d 889 (1943);
Stevens v. Stevens, 266 Mich. 446, 254 N. W. 162 (1934); Higginbotham v.
Higginbotham, - Mo. App.- , 146 S. W. 2d 856 (1940), Cert. denied,
348 Mo. 1073, 156 S. W. 2d 650 (1941); Mohrmann v. Kobb, 291 N. Y. 181,
51 N. E. 2d 921 (1943); Kemmelick v. Kemmelick, 114 Misc. 198, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 3 (1921) ; Mainzer v. Mainzer, 108 Misc. 230, 177 N. Y. Supp. 596 (1919) ;
Dillion v. Dillion, - Tex. Civ. App. , 274 S. W. 217 (1925). See Notes,
70 A. L. R. 964 (1931) and 149 A. L. R. 1284 (1944). Since the commencement
of this note the Georgia court has reiterated the rule in Sternberg v. Sternberg,
46 S. E. Zd 349 (Ga. 1948) ; see note 20 infra for interesting history of this case.
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